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Nonlinearities in the Real Exchange Rate  
and Monetary Policy: 








Empirical research during the last ten years has found significant evidence in favour of a 
nonlinear-threshold type behaviour of the real exchange rate. Interest rate rules which 
include the exchange rate appear to have either an insignificant effect on or generate small 
coefficients for the real exchange rate. However, the empirical studies do not take into 
account the nonlinear behaviour of the exchange rate. The inclusion of nonlinearities in the 
real exchange rate could imply nonlinear behaviour in the interest rate rule, whenever the 
exchange rate is included. We use a two-country sticky price model to show that nonlinear 
Taylor-type rules where the exchange rate is included lead to lower variation in output and 
inflation. 
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Recent work on monetary economics has focused on the modeling of monetary
policy in models of imperfect competition and nominal rigidities. The virtue of
such models is that they provide a better insight into the evaluation of alternative
monetary policies. Nominal rigidities and market power allow for real e￿ects. Al-
ternative policies concern speci￿cations about the way the Central Bank conducts
monetary policy. Moreover, recent work has focused on the evaluation of monetary
policy for open economies (Gali and Monacelli, 2005; Benigno, 2004; Monacelli,
2003; Svensson, 2000; Ball, 1998).
Research on monetary policy, however, has focused more on models with closed
economies, or on interest rate rules where the target variables are the in￿ation
rate and the output gap (Taylor type rules). This approach relies on the fact that
the real or nominal exchange rate need not be included in the rule. One reason
is that the exchange rate e￿ect exists indirectly. The exchange rate a￿ects the
other two target variables, anyway, through its pass-through e￿ect (Taylor, 1999;
Ball, 1998). Another reason is that data do not support its existence in the rule
(Clarida et al., 1998)1. On the other hand, others tend to argue for the importance
of including the exchange rate in a feedback rule 2 (Svensson, 2000).
Exchange rate behavior has been the focus of much research since the early ’90s.
Rogo￿ (1996) originally inaugurated a new kind of approach regarding the short
run and the long run dynamics of the exchange rate. The ’PPP-Puzzle’ put into
question the standard linear time series techniques as a way of estimating the
horizons needed in order for the exchange rate to mean revert 3. Simple AR models
appeared unable to capture the behavior observed. Additionally, standard linear
time series tests could not reject the null of no stationarity, implying that the real
exchange rate is a random walk and, thus, invalidating long-run purchasing power
parity4. Half life estimates appeared to be incorrect as well 5.
The existence of transaction costs in the interantional trade of goods a￿ects the
trade volume and hence the behavior of the exchange rate. When transaction
costs are high, international trade is less pro￿table. Consequently, deviations of
the real exchange from PPP will be corrected very slowly. On the other hand when
transaction costs are low, international trade is pro￿table and the real exchange
rate will inherit a mean reverting property. Therefore, the existence of such costs
1Clarida et al. found either very small or statistically insigni￿cant coe￿cients for the exchange rate in a
forward looiking interest rate rule.
2Svensson also argues that apart from the exchange rate, foreign fundamental variables appear to be important
in the feedback rule.
3The ’PPP-Puzzle’ states the following: how can one reconcile long-run mean reversion with short-run high
volatility.
4For a detailed analysis on exchange rate behavior see Coakley, Flood, Fuertes and Taylor (2005), MacDonald
and Taylor (1994) and the references therein.
5Half life is the number of periods it takes a shock to dissipate by a half.
2in international trade imply a threshold (nonlinear) behavior for the real exchange
rate6.
In this paper, we argue that the threshold type behavior of the exchange rate must
be taken into account when the latter is included into an interest rate rule. We
argue that the nominal interest rate need not react to exchange rate movements
when transaction costs are high and the volume of international trade low. The
nominal interest rate reacts to the exchange rate movements only when the latter’s
deviation from PPP is high or when transaction costs are low 7. If the real exchange
rate enters in a linear fashion in the interest rate rule, then inference may not be
valid due to model misspeci￿cation. Consequently, policy implications will be
wrong.
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we use data for major economies
against the US to rpovide support for the nonlinearities in the interest rate when
the real exchange rate is introduced. In section 3 we develop a DSGE two country
model with transaction costs to show that the existence of such costs entails a
threshold type behavior for the real exchange rate. In section 4 we present the
log linearized version of the model. In section 5 we introduce monetary policy by
examining how the system behaves under alternative interest rate rules. In section
6 we present the conclusions and policy implications.
2 Empirical evidence and motivation
In this section we use real time series data to estimate a parsimonious VAR model
similar to that estimated in Rudebusch (2002). The use of unrestricted VAR mod-
els in examining monetary policy has been criticized. However, they can constitute
a simple benchmark for the dynamics of a structural model 8. Rudebusch estimates
a near VAR model of three equations, one for output, one for the in￿ation rate
and one for the interest rate. We extend this model by introducing the exchange
rate in the VAR. The exchange rate is allowed to have both contemporaneous and
lagged e￿ects in the system. In particular, we allow the exchange rate to a￿ect the
in￿ation rate both contemporaneously and with a lag. In the four variable VAR
6From a theoretical point of view, modelling a behavior like that described in the ’PPP-Puzzle’ is nontrivial.
Nominal regidities may not be enough to generate persistence in the real exchange rate. Persistence could be
generated by the degree of correlation in monetary shocks as in Chari et al. (2000) and Benigno (2004). However,
this ￿nding could be weak in case of a low degree of autocorrelation. Additionally, this approach tries to epxlain
the persistence in real exchange rate relying on assumptions concerning exogenous variables, without endogenizing
it. Gali and Monacelli (2004), in an attempt to model volatility in the real exchange rate, ￿nd that the former
is determined by the degree of correlation between productivity and world output. A high positive (negative)
correlation between domestic productivity and world ouptut will tend to decrease (increase) the volatility of the
nominal and real exchange rates.
7In other words we argue that the interest rate should react to exchange rate movement only when international
trade is pro￿table.
8For a more detailed analysis on the weaknesses and the criticism on unrestricted VARs in monetary policy
analysis see Rudebusch (1998) and the references therein.
3four lags of the in￿ation rate, output and the nominal interest rate are introduced.
Speci￿cally, the VAR interest rate equation regresses the nominal interest rate it
on four lags of each variable and on the contemporaneous values of the in￿ation
and the output gap. The in￿ation equation regresses the CPI rate t on four lags
of each variable as well as the contemporaneous value of the output gap and the
exchange rate. The output gap 9 equation regresses the output gap yt on four lags
of all the variables. Finally, the exchange rate equation regresses the exchange
rate qt on four lags of each variable as well as the contemporaneous value of the
nominal interest rate. We allowed for the latter due to the fact that interest rate
movements are likely to a￿ect in the short-run the spot rate, and, thus, due to
nominal rigidities, the real one. The near VAR representation is de￿ned as
Xt = A1Xt 1 + A2Xt 2 + A3Xt 3 + A4Xt 4 + +I
t
where Ai; i = 1;2;3;4 are 4  4 matrices speci￿ed in Appendix 1 and Xt =
(it;qt;yt;t)
0: I is a 4  4 identity matrix and
t is a 4  1 matrix of i:i:d: errors.
2.1 Data
We assume a two country model. US is assumed to be the foreign country. Japan,
Germany, France and the United Kingdom are assumed to be the home country
in each case.
Quarterly data were gathered from the IMF International Financial Statistics for
the CPI of each country, the end of period spot exchange rate of the Japanese
Yen, the German Mark, the French franc and the UK pound against the US dollar
respectively. The ￿nancing bill rate for Japan, the Treasury Bill rate for France,
Germany, the UK and the US were used as proxies for the nominal interest rate.
Data for Japan and the United Kingdom cover the period from Q1 1970 through
Q2 2009, whereas data for Germany and France cover the period from Q1 1970
though Q4 1998.
2.2 Linearity tests
As a next step, we performed system and equation speci￿c linearity tests. The
testing procedure is the same as that described in Van Dijk (1999) 10. The linearity
9The output gap was proxied using the hp ￿lter. The latter’s accuracy in capturing the actual output gap
has been criticized. One reason is that the natural rate of output is proxied by a deterministic trend. However,
the former may be a function of technology, monetary and demand shocks, and thus, more volatile. For a more
detailed survey on the criticism on the output gap measures see Gali (2002), Gali and Gertler (1999), Sbordone
(1999), Gertler, Gali and Lopez-Salido (2000) and the references therein.
10For a more detailed description of the testing procedure for both univariate and multivariate models see
Terasvirta (1994), Granger and Terasvirta (1993) and Van Dijk (1999) and the references therein.
4tests were performed by estimating an auxiliary regression that is consisted by a
linear and a nonlinear part. The linear part is the same as that described by the
VAR representation above. Assuming that the real exchange rate is the transition








where qt is the real exchange rate12.
The system linearity test13 tests the null of  2 =  3 =  4 = 0, that is, all el-
ements of the three matrices are equal to zero. However, for the sake of power
and, hence, better inference we also performed equation speci￿c linearity tests 14.
In all cases the system linearity tests reject the null of linearity. The equation
speci￿c linearity tests reject linearity in the interest rate equation in each country.
Additionally, linearity is rejected in the in￿ation equation, and, unsurprisingly, in
the real exchange rate equation. The interesting result is that in none of the cases
could linearity be rejected in the output gap equation. The results of the tests are
presented at Tables 1 and 2 below.
Table 1: Linearity tests (threshold variable: qt 1)
France Germany Japan UK
it 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
qt 0.000 0.000 0.030 0.001
yt 0.620 0.500 0.083 0.183
t 0.000 0.245 0.097 0.001
Notes: P   values from equation speci￿c tests reported.
11The auxiliary regressions correspond to a smooth transition autoregressive model with a zero threshold, that
is a two regime model. The adjustment can be either symmetric or asymmetric. The testing procedure, though,
is robust to both modes of adjustment.
12The real exchange rate is lagged one period in the auxiliary regression. This is the delay parameter which, in
our case, implies that it takes the real exchange rate one period (e.g. quarter) to switch from one regime to the
other.
13System linearity tests were performed as F   tests. They could have also been performed as LM   tests.
However, Terasvirta (1994) shows that the F   version of the test is better sized, especially when the sample is
small and the number of restrictions large.
14System linearity tests are expected to have greater power as it is enough that in only one of
th\sum_{i=1}^{4}e four equations the null of linearity is rejected, so that to reject linearity in the system.
Consequently, relying only on the system linearity tests, one cannot derive secure inference about which equations
in the system have nonlinear terms.
5Table 2: Linearity tests (threshold variable: t 1)
France Germany Japan UK
it 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
qt 0.000 0.000 0.004 0.064
yt 0.917 0.952 0.181 0.473
t 0.014 0.627 0.097 0.001
Notes: P   values from equation speci￿c tests reported.
As a next step, a three variate VAR as in Rudebusch (2002) was estimated without
the real exchange rate. Linearity tests were performed. At ￿rst, we used the real
exchange rate as the threshold variable. Only for the UK could we reject the null
of linearity in the interest rate equation. The results are shown at table 3 below.
Table 3: Linearity tests (threshold variable: qt 1)
France Germany Japan UK
it 0.821 0.204 0.062 0.000
yt 0.578 0.399 0.412 0.109
t 0.437 0.073 0.091 0.000
Notes: P   values from equation speci￿c tests reported.
The null of linearity is not rejected at 5% signi￿cance level for France, Germany
and Japan. However, linearity is rejected in the interest rate and the in￿ation
equation for the UK in the trivariate system as well. As a second step, the above
procedure was repeated using the in￿ation rate as the threshold variable 15. The
results are shown at table 4 below.
Table 4: Linearity tests (threshold variable: t 1)
France Germany Japan UK
it 0.861 0.000 0.471 0.000
yt 0.384 0.615 0.271 0.293
t 0.655 0.561 0.000 0.000
Notes: P   values from equation speci￿c tests reported.
When the in￿ation rate is the threshold variable, linearity is rejected for the Ger-
man and the UK treasury bill rate equation. It is not rejected for France and
Japan. Linearity in the interest rate equation is rejected in all four cases in the
four variable VAR, independently of what the threshold variable is. On the other
hand, in the trivariate VAR, linearity is rejected only for the UK interest rate
equation when the threshold variable is the real exchange rate. When the in￿ation
rate is the threshold variable, linearity in the interest rate equation is rejected for
the UK and Germany in the trivariate VAR. Finally, in the four variable VAR
15In this case we assume that it takes the in￿ation rate one quarter to start its adjustment, implying a delay
parameter equal to one.
6linearity in the exchange rate equation is always rejected. Therefore, non linearity
in the interest rate is always rejected whenever the real exchange rate is intro-
duced in the system. For France and Japan, the data show that non linearity in
the interest rate setting is caused by the real exchange rate exclusively. The same
holds for Germany when the real exchange rate rate is the threshold variable in
the trivariate system. However, the data show that interest rate setting is always
nonlinear (or of a threshold type) for the UK. Consequently, they provide evidence
in favor of a threshold type interest rate rule whenever the real exchange rate is
introduced as a target variable.
3 Structure of the Model
A stochastic model is speci￿ed as in Benigno (2004), Obstfeld and Rogo￿ (1998,
1999). Prices adjust in a sticky way as in Calvo (1983). Each country exports and
imports goods. There are shipping costs (iceberg type) in transporting goods from
one country to the other. Transaction costs are modelled as in Dumas (1992),
Sercu, Van Hulle and Uppal (1995) and Coeurdacier (2006) 16. As a result this
implies that trade will not always take place. Only when the price of the exported
good is such that makes trade pro￿table, will each country be involved in interna-
tional trade. When the real exchange rate lies inside certain bands then trade is
not pro￿table and, hence, each economy will consume only domestically produced
goods. Hence, the degree of openness of an economy depends on where the real ex-
change rate lies (i.e. within or outside the thresholds that determine international
trade).
Monetary policy is conducted by the Central Bank which uses the short term nom-
inal interest rate as its instrument. In the present model, the Central Bank must
take into account whether the home country is involved in international trade or
not. The threshold behavior of the real exchange rate, implies a threshold behavior
for the instrument, once the former is introduced into the rule. Consequently, the
interest rate rule will be regime dependent.
3.1 Households
There are two countries where a continuum of goods is produced in each and agents
have identical preferences. Home country residents constitute the interval [0, n],
while foreign residents (n, 1]. The population size is set equal to the number of the
goods produced. Hence, home country produces goods on the interval [0, n], while
foreign country produces goods on (n, 1]. Home agents and goods are indexed by
16Coeurdacier introduces transaction costs in the price aggregator assuming that the price of the imported good
will be (1 + )pj. We follow the same approach.
7h, while foreign agents and goods by f. Home agent’s consumption at date t is
denoted by Ch
t , real money holdings by
Mh
t
Pt and labor supply by Lh
t. Home agent






















where  is the degree of relative risk aversion. Ch



















;  > 0 (2)
where  captures the intratemporal elasticity of substitution between home and
foreign goods.   1
2 is a parameter of home bias in preferences.CH is the home
































H;t + (1   )[(1 + t)PF;t]
1  1
1  (4)
where PH and PF prices indices for home goods and foreign goods, expressed in
the domestic currency and t captures the time varying transaction cost assumed























8Agents in both economies hold home country’s one period bond. Home resident’s
bond holdings at date t are denoted by Bt. Foreign resident’s bond holdings are
denoted by Bt
"t , where "t denotes the nominal exchange rate, de￿ned as the
domestic price of the foreign currency. The home agent maximizes her utility
subject to the period budget constraint
PtCt + M
h
t + Bt = (1 + it)Bt + Wt + Mt 1 + St (6)
where Wt is the nominal wage, St are nominal transfers the individual receives
from the government and it is the nominal interest rate.
Government’s balanced budget requires the following
 n
0




3.2 First order conditions
Maximizing the utility function (1) subject to the budget constraint (6) yields the


























where the ￿rst equation is the usual Euler equation, the second determines the
labor supply schedule and the third the demand for real money balances.
9Individual demands for each good z produced in the home and in the foreign





















(1   )Ct (12)
3.3 Real exchange rate and transaction costs
The law of one price does not hold continuously in the model. If transaction costs
in international goods markets were ignored, then international goods trade would
eliminate any deviation from the law implying, thus, a mean reverting behavior of
the real exchange rate. In this model, however, transaction costs imply that goods
will not always be traded internationally. Only when the total costs of shipping
the good are such that pro￿table opportunities arise, will the international trade
volume be high. Otherwise, each country will consume domestically produced
goods more. In other words, the presence of transaction costs generate an area
where international trade volume is low. In the absence of transaction costs,
international trade will occur until price di￿erentials are decreased in such a level
where no pro￿table opportunities will exist any longer.
The assumption of complete markets and identical preferences implies that the real
exchange rate will be given by the ratio of the marginal utilities of consumption of
the foreign and home residents 17. Given agents in both countries hold only Home




















Therefore, the Euler equation from the foreign agent’s maximization problem is
17Moreover, we have assumed that only traded goods exist. The introduction of non traded goods would not
change the results presented here, as we focus on developed countries. In these countries the percentage of the






































0 depends on initial conditions and qt =
"tP
t
Pt is the real
exchange rate.
The ratio of foreign to home marginal utility of consumption is found to be bounded
below and above by thresholds whose value is determined by the shares of con-





















































t and Pt are the price levels of the foreign and home country.
Once the real exchange rate touches the upper threshold then home country in-
creases its exports, whereas once it touches the lower threshold the home country
increases its imports of foreign goods. Therefore, the behavior of the real exchange
rate when international trade takes place is summarized as
qt =
8
> > > > <





























11The thresholds will be symmetric as in Sercu, Van Hulle and Uppal (1995), if
equal shares are assumed and if relative prices of goods consumed in the foregn
country are equal to one. When the real exchange rate lies within the above
thresholds, then the volume of trade will be low due to high transaction costs.
Since transaction costs are high in the middle regime, traders are not interested in
trading internationally due to the absence of pro￿table opportunities. Additionally,
the Central Bank is not interested in intervening in the face of real exchange rate
movements. Therefore, the exchange rate will behave either as a random walk,
or as an autoregressive process with a high degree of persistence. The larger the
deviations from the law of one price, the higher the pro￿ts from international trade,
and the larger the volume of trade. Consequently, the speed of mean reversion of
the real exchange rate will be higher, the farther away it is from the thresholds.
The speed of mean reversion will be decreased as it moves closer to the bands.
3.4 Price setting
Prices are sticky with a price setting behavior a `a Calvo (1983). At each date,
each ￿rm changes its price with a probability 1   ! , regardless of the time since
it last adjusted its price. The probability of not changing the price, thus, is
!. The probability of not changing the price in the subsequent s periods is !s.
Consequently, the price decision at time t determines pro￿ts for the next s periods.




















Similarly, for the foreign goods consumed in the home economy:

1 


























Firm’s maximization problem comprises of two decisions. The one concerns the
price for the domestic market and the other the price charged in the foreign market,
when it exports.
A continuum of ￿rms is assumed for home economy indexed by z 2 [0;n]. Each
￿rm produces a di￿erentiated good, with a technology
Yt(z) = AtLt(z) (23)
where At is a country speci￿c productivity shock at date t which is assumed to
follow a log-di￿erence stationary process t = tt 1 + t, where t is an i:i:d:
process.
Each ￿rm chooses a price for the home economy and a price for the foreign economy,




















t(h); i = h;f is the demand for the home good for home and foreign
agents.
When no trade takes place, the ￿rm chooses one price, that for the home economy















































The ￿rm maximizes its objective function (24) subject to (25) in order to ￿nd
the optimal price for the Home good in the Home economy. It maximizes subject
to (26), in order to ￿nd the optimal price for the Home good in the Foreign
economy. The ￿rm chooses a price for the Home good in the Home economy that















At+s denotes the nominal marginal cost and 
 1 captures the
optimal markup. The optimal price, thus, for the Home good in the Home































4 Log linearized model
A log linearized version of the relationships found in the previous section serves
in providing us with a way to deal with the problem of no closed form solution.
Additionally, this is a way to end up in a state space form which can be estimated
using real time series data.
144.1 Supply side
We use a ￿rst order Taylor approximation around the steady state of zero in￿ation
rate. Log linearized variables are denoted with a hat.
After loglinearizing the ￿rst order condition (9), the price level equations (21) and
(22), the production function (23) the demand schedules faced by each ￿rm (25)
and (26) and optimal price setting rules (27) and (28), we receive the two relations
describing the domestically consumed home goods in￿ation rate and the respective
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q ^ qt+b^ t+"
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H;t (30)
where "H;t and "
H;t are i:i:d: cost push shocks. Tt =
PF;t






the terms of trade for the Home and Foreign country respectively.
The log linearized aggregate price level relation (22) is speci￿ed as
t = H;t + (1   )(F;t   H;t + ^ t) (31)
Note that equations (29) and (30) describe the home goods in￿ation rate in the
Home and the Foreign country when the exchange rate is outside the middle regime
given in (18), that is, when the Home country is exporting or importing. In this
case the aggregate in￿ation rate is given by (31).
The Home country in￿ation dynamics 18 are de￿ned as in (31) which is analyzed
further as
t = Ett+1 + 1t + 2

t + 3 ^ Ct + 4 ^ Tt + 5 ^ T

t + 6^ qt + 7^ t + t (32)
where t is consisted by two i:i:d: terms.
18The aggregate in￿ation dynamics are speci￿ed here under the assumption that ￿rms face the same degree of
price stickiness within the same country.
154.2 Demand side
In this section we proceed to the loglinearization of the Euler equation
Ct = (it   Ett+1) + EtCt+1 (33)
where  =   1
.
Goods market clearing assumes the following two conditions
Y = YH + Y

H and Y
 = YF + Y

F
Using the demand schedules as in (25) and (26), and then loglinearizing using the
goods market equilibrium conditions, we end up to the following expressions for

























Therefore, combining equations (33) and (34), we derive the aggregate demand
equation:















(1   )(1   )(2   1)










where  =  
(2 1)
 .
4.3 Real exchange rate behavior
As already mentioned the real exchange rate exhibits regime switching behavior
depending on whether trade takes place or not. The larger the deviation from the
bands (or absolute PPP in case of a two regime model), the higher the volume
of trade, and, thus, the faster the real exchange rate reverts back to the thresh-
olds. When no trade occurs, the real exchange rate depends highly on its lagged
values. Additionally, under the assumption of identical preferences, frictionless
16￿nancial markets and the even stronger assumption of the same degree of price
stickiness across the two countries, the real exchange rate behaves as a random
walk within the thresholds. Such a behavior is consistent with empirical literature
on exchange rate, where smooth transition autoregressive models seem to solve the
so-called ’PPP-Puzzle’19. In particular, Taylor, Peel and Sarno (2001), Sarno and
Taylor (2001), Taylor and Peel (2000), Lothian and Taylor (1997), Mac Donald
and Taylor (1994) and Sarno, Taylor and Chowdhury (2004) using either quarterly
or monthly data for major currencies found signi￿cant evidence in favor of thresh-
old (or nonlinear) behavior of the real exchange rate. Combining (15), (34) and
the respective equations for the foreign country, we derive the equation describing

































4.4 Terms of trade
The terms of trade determine the competitive advantage of each of the two coun-
tries. For the home country the terms of trade variable is de￿ned as Tt =
PF;t
PH;t,





F;t. We can write the follow-
ing two expressions for the two terms of trade.
^ Tt = ^ Tt 1 + F;t   H;t; ^ T








Using the log linearized ￿rst order condition of the ￿rm’s maximization problem,
￿rst order condition (9), the consumption equation (34), the output equation (35)
and the respective equations for the foreign country, the home country terms of
trade is speci￿ed as
^ Tt = 1 ^ Tt 1 + 2Ett+1 + 3Et

t+1 + 4^ Yt + 5^ Y

t + 6 ^ T

t + 7^ qt + 8^ t + 9t (37)
19Rogo￿ (1996) questions the e￿ectiveness of standard linear autoregressive models in capturing the short run
high volatility of the exchange rate with a slow long run mean reversion. As a result, half life estimates, using
linear models, appeared to be incorrect.
17where the parameters i; i = 1;:::;9 are de￿ned in the appendix.
4.5 Flexible price equilibrium
At the ￿exible price equilibrium ￿rms adjust their prices at each period. Each ￿rm






is constant over time and equal across ￿rms. Since ￿rms adjust their prices every
period, monetary policy will not have any real e￿ects into the economy. The real







mct = wt   t   
where wt is the real wage, t (log) productivity and  a subsidy to labor. Identical
prices and demand conditions imply that the quantities produced and consumed
will be the same. Solving for the case with ￿exible prices, we receive the following
set of equations describing the equilibrium processes for output, consumption,
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 qt =   a (
t   t) +  ( " +  ")("
td   "td) (42)
where  a =
(+1)(+)
(2(2+)+2),  a =
(1 )(+1)
(2(2+)+2),   =
( (+))(2+)
2(2(2+)+2) ,   =
(2+)
(2(2+)+2),  " =
(+)
(2(2+)+2),  " =
2(1 )
2(2+)+2,  =  + .
From the interest rate equation (41) it is evident that the interest rate response to
di￿erent shocks, and especially to shocks that a￿ect it independently of the regime
the real exchange rate lies (e.g. domestic productivity, Home demand shock and
transaction costs), changes depending on the volume of international trade. In
particular, the interest rate response to domestic productivity shocks is smaller
when the real exchange rate lies between the thresholds. The same result holds for
the interest rate response to changes in transaction costs. The degree of response,
however, to domestic demand shocks is ambiguous. Given  < 0, the interest
rate response to domestic productivity shocks is positive, whereas it is negative
with respect to foreign productivity shocks. From (46) one observes that the real
exchange rate persistence and volatility depends on the degree of correlation of the
demand shocks, the productivity shocks and the cross correlations between the
productivity di￿erentials and the demand shocks, the Home productivity shock
and the Home demand shock, the Home productivity and the Foreign demand
shock, the foreign productivity and the Home demand shock, and lastly, on the
correlation between the Foreign productivity shock and the Foreign demand shock.
A unit serial correlation between the two demand shocks and the two productivity
shocks implies absolute PPP (zero persistence and low volatility). Positive cross
correlations between the productivity di￿erential and the demand shock di￿erential
implies lower volatility for the real exchange rate. The same holds for the rest
of cross correlations among the two kinds of shocks. The volatility of the real
exchange rate can be speci￿ed as
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19Finally, the natural levels of output, consumption, labor, real interest rate and real
exchange rate vary not only according to the exogenous processes of the transac-
tion costs, technology and demand shocks, but also according to where the real
exchange rate lies (i.e. within or outside the thresholds) 20.
5 Monetary Policy
Monetary policy is conducted through nominal interest rate rules by the Central
Bank. The rules considered in this paper are various and serve the main goal. The
latter is whether a nonlinear (or a threshold type) interest rate rule is the optimal
policy rule, when the real exchange rate is introduced in it. That question relies on
the real exchange rate literature that supports the view of threshold type, or more
generally, nonlinear behavior of the real exchange rate. Therefore, this raises the
question of whether non linearity inherent in the real exchange rate is the source
of nonlinearities in the interest rate rule.
Open economy monetary policy literature has rejected the importance of the ex-
change rate in the interest rate feedback rules, either because it is argued that
its e￿ect is already there, indirectly through its pass through on prices and then
in in￿ation (Ball, 1999; Taylor, 1999), or because data do not support its signi￿-
cance21 (Clarida, Gali and Gertler, 1998). However, a weakness of that literature
is that it does not take into account the potential nonlinear behavior of the real
exchange rate, or alternatively, the existence of transaction costs either in the
goods, or in ￿nancial markets. As already shown the existence of transaction costs
determines the trade volume internationally, and, thus, the way the real exchange
rate behaves. The threshold behavior of the real exchange rate (and the nominal
exchange rate due to nominal rigidities) implies a threshold type feedback rule
whenever the latter is introduced.
After the introduction of the real exchange rate in the interest rate feedback rules,
more generalized ones are considered. The latter allow for foreign fundamentals
in the rule22. Svensson (2000) considers variants of Taylor type feedback rules.
Simulation results exhibit a non-negligible weight of the exchange rate on the
interest rate rule. Moreover, foreign fundamentals appear to be an important
component in the rule. However, focusing only on the coe￿cients of the additional
variables in the rule is not a su￿cient condition for choosing the optimal policy.
The focus must, rather, be on the extent to which the overall variation in output
or in￿ation, or both (depending on the objectives of the Central Banker) is altered
across the di￿erent policy rules.
20The thresholds de￿ned in (18) change appropriately in the ￿exible price case since P = P. Therefore, they
are determined only exogenously by the transaction costs process.
21This argument is supported through either very small, or statistically insigni￿cant coe￿cients, or both.
22Taking into account the fundamental equations found in our model, it is evident that optimal control policies
allow for foreign fundamentals to be one of the determinants of the nominal interest rate.
205.1 Policy rules
In this section we focus on di￿erent policy rules. We characterize optimal the rule
that leads to the lowest variation in output and in￿ation. Each rule leads to a
di￿erent system of equations and, thus, di￿erent conditions that are necessary for
determinacy. In each case we provide those conditions. The rules considered will
be of a standard Taylor form to more generalized ones.
5.1.1 Forward versus contemporaneous rules
Interest rate rules which rely on current values of both the output gap and in￿a-
tion have been used widely because of their simplicity and their ability to induce
determinate equilibria23 . However, beyond the simplicity in their use in a system
of equations, rules where the interest rate is determined by the current values of
the output gap and in￿ation have been criticized as unrealistic. McCallum (1999)
has criticized such rules as unrealistic due to the fact that policymakers lack in-
formation about the output gap and in￿ation the quarter they form their policy.
Bullard and Mittra (2002) note that with such a speci￿cation of the interest rate
rule tension is introduced, because the monetary authority is reacting to time t in-
formation on in￿ation and the output gap. Consequently, the monetary authority
has more information than the private sector. The latter forms its expectations
at date t using all the information available until date t   1. For that reason, for-
ward looking rules will be considered as well 24. In the cases where expectational
variables are considered, we assume that the private sector and the monetary au-
thority have the same information set and form their expectations at the same
time. We consider rules where the interest rate is determined by the expectations
about the output gap and in￿ation solely, and rules where the expectation about
the real exchange rate is added. Those two rule are speci￿ed as
it = Ett+1 + xEtxt+1 + "1t (43)
it = Ett+1 + xEtxt+1 + qEtqt+1 + "2t (44)
where xt is an output gap measure and "1t, "2t are monetary i:i:d: shocks.
23The conditions necessary for determinacy using simple Taylor rules in a closed economy framework see Bullard
and Mittra (2002), Gali (2002) and the references therein. Additionally for a more detailed analysis of the
conditions for stability in a system of di￿erence equations see Blanchard and Khan (1980).
24The pitfalls of the interest rate rules using current values of the target variables may jeopardize the credibility
of the monetary authority, and, thus, cause an in￿ation bias in the long-run.
215.1.2 Lagged data rules
An alternative way to deal with the above criticism is to use lagged data rules,
instead of froward looking ones 25. The only di￿erence with the previous case is
the conditions necessary determinacy. in this case the policy rules that will be
considered are summarized as
it = t 1 + xxt 1 + "3t (45)
it = t 1 + xxt 1 + qqt 1 + "4t (46)
5.1.3 In￿ation targeting rules
The natural rate of output, speci￿ed in (42), is determined by Home productivity
and demand shocks. Additionally, when the real exchange rate lies on the thresh-
olds (or beyond them), the natural rate of output depends on the Foreign country
productivity and demand shocks and the transaction cost as well. That is, the nat-
ural rate of output is determined by exogenous processes. Moreover, the central
bank or the private sector cannot form expectations or even observe the future and
the current behavior of those processes. This causes the problem of a good and
reliable measure for the output gap. Using detrended series to approximate the
output gap might be risky, since the natural rate of output, and hence the output
gap, is likely to be more volatile 26. Consequently, the problem of measurement er-
ror arises, which may lead to the wrong policy responses and, hence, to instability.
Gali (2000), McCallum and Nelson (1999) and Rotemberg and Woodford (1999)
argue that using detrended output in the interest rate rule may cause ine￿ciencies,
especially when shocks to fundamentals call for large changes in output. The out-
put gap induced by such a policy will, in turn, lead to unnecessary ￿uctuations in
in￿ation (Gali, 2002)27. Therefore, rules where no weight is placed on the output
stabilization are considered as well. Orphanides (1999) refers to the advantages of
such rules, as they decrease the risks related to large and persistent measurement
errors in the output gap.
25Bullard and Mittra (2002) argue that such rules are closer to the reality of central bank practice.
26The volatility of the natural rate of output has the same sources as the real exchange rate plus the transaction
cost and its correlation with the other shocks.
27Gali stresses the practical di￿culties in implementing such rules associated with the measurement of variables
like total factor productivity.
226 Conclusions (preliminary)
We used a DSGE model to show that when transaction costs exist in international
trade the real exchange rate exhibits threshold behavior. Such costs determine the
volume of trade. When the exchange rate is introduced in the interest rate rule
then the nominal interest rate appears to be nonlinear as supported by the data.
Therefore, nonlinear interest rate rules are the correct model speci￿cation when
the exchange rate is taken into account. Additionally, such rules lead to lower
output gap and in￿ation variance.
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